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ARTICLE
VIRGINIA'S JURY EXEMPTIONS: RIPE FOR REFORM
T. S. Ellis, HI*
J. Thomas O'Brien, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Jury exemptions' are frequent targets of derisory comment. Who
among us has not heard of the proverbial litigant who, upon hear-
ing his lawyer describe juries and jury exemptions, remarked that
only a fool would place his fate in the hands of seven or twelve
people who were not smart enough to get excused through an ex-
emption.2 Indeed, the number and scope of jury exemptions have
grown so substantially over the years' that it is not unreasonable
to suppose that jury non-service is now the norm and jury service
the exception.
This is not an inconsequential matter; the jury system is central
to the administration of justice in Virginia. It is and has been the
institution through which the public participates and contributes
to the legal system.4 Indeed, public participation in juries is an im-
* Member, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.S.E., 1961, Princeton University;
J.D., 1969, Harvard University; Dip. L., 1970, Oxford University. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of David E. Boelzner, Associate, Hunton & Williams; J.D., 1986,
University of Texas, in the preparation of this article.
**Associate, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.S., 1982, University of Virginia;
J.D., 1986, University of Richmond.
1. The term "jury exemptions" is used generically here to mean all those Virginia statutes
excluding or excusing defined classes of people from jury service either automatically or
upon request. See VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 8.01-341, -341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984). But "jury exemp-
tion" as usea here does not include disqualification. Thus, a felon is disqualified from jury
service, not exempt from it.
2. See E. MCKENZIE, 14,000 Quips & QuoTEs 277 (1980).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 5-43.
4. Virtually nothing, including this point, escaped the attention of Alexis de Toqueville.
He wrote:
The institution of the jury may be aristocratic or democratic, according to the class of
society from which the jurors are selected; but it always preserves its republican char-
acter, inasmuch as it places the real direction of society in the hands of the governed,
or a portion of the governed, instead of leaving it under the authority of the
government.
A. DEToQuEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (12th ed. 1969).
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portant reason for the political acceptability of the legal system. 5 It
is, therefore, important to consider, as we do here, whether Vir-
ginia's jury exemptions have so grown in number and scope as to
undermine the jury's authority, its efficacy, or its important role in
ensuring the political acceptability of the legal system. Put simply,
this article considers whether principle and policy argue for the ab-
olition of Virginia's jury exemptions.'
In exploring this issue, this article focuses first on the history of
exemptions in Virginia. Knowledge of the origin of exemptions and
the reasons for their enactment helps shed light on whether they
should be retained or abolished. Next, exemptions are placed in a
constitutional context, not because Virginia's exemptions, singly or
together, violate the state or federal Constitution, but because the
constitutional analysis helps shed light on the issue of abolition.
This is followed by an examination of the policy considerations,
leading thereafter to our conclusion that Virginia should repeal her
jury exemptions and implement instead (at least in urban areas)
the one-day/one-trial system so successful in other jurisdictions.
II. HISTORY
The commonwealth's first sixty years passed without a statutory
exemption from jury duty. Not until 1838 was one enacted. In
that year, the General Assembly began the march of statutory jury
exemptions by granting this privilege to firemen in Richmond and
Portsmouth.' This was just the beginning. In the next decade, this
exemption was joined by several others relating to other fire com-
panies,9 superintendents of lunatic asylums, 10 and school commis-
5. Justice Black put it well when he wrote that "[t]he jury injects a democratic element
into the law. This element is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice, not
only in safeguarding the rights of the accused, but in encouraging popular acceptance of the
laws and the necessary general acquiescence in their application." Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 215-16 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (majority affirming criminal contempt
convictions without jury trial).
6. Abolition of jury exemptions has been mentioned in the context of tort reform. See
Virginians for Tort Reform, Proposal for Tort Reform Legislation in Virginia, presented to
the Joint Subcommittee Studying the Insurance Crisis and the Need for Tort Reform (Sept.
8, 1986). While abolition would, arguably, have a beneficial effect on the tort system by
broadening participation on juries, abolition of exemptions must be considered on its own
merits-and is so here-irrespective of its relation to availability and cost of insurance.
7. See 1838 Va. Acts 68.
8. Id.
9. See 1839 Va. Acts 141, 142 (Jan. Sess.); 1839-40 Va. Acts 44 (Dec. Sess.); 1847-48 Va.
Acts 325; 1848-49 Va. Acts 196.
10. See 1839 Va. Acts 15 (Jan. Sess.); 1840-41 Va. Acts 38-39; 1846-47 Va. Acts 16-17.
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sioners.11 These, along with exemptions for the governor, practicing
attorneys, officers of courts, and military personnel were all codi-
fied in the Code of 1849.12
What little legislative history exists concerning the Code of 1849
is silent on the reasons for this initial batch of exemptions.13 None-
theless, the reasons seem evident; Virginia's communities were
thought to be better served by having the classes of exempted per-
sons plying their trades or professions rather than serving jury
duty. This is all the more understandable given that jury duty
could involve weeks of service and given that there were relatively
few persons qualified to perform the functions of those exempted.
After 1849, the number and range of exemptions continued to
grow. In the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the
twentieth centuries, the following groups, among others, were
added to the list: physicians, 14 telegraph operators, 5 farmers,16 un-
dertakers,'7 pharmacists,' dentists,19 optometrists, 0 and the six
lock-keepers of the Dismal Swamp. 21 These were not, for the most
part, particularly surprising additions. These groups, like the origi-
nal groups, were apparently considered too vital to their communi-
ties to expend on jury duty. This period also saw the list of statu-
tory exemptions grow in another way: geographic groups.
Transportation difficulties apparently led to exemptions for citi-
zens of Tangier, Saxis22 and Chincoteague Islands in Accomack
County; Hog (now Broadwater), and Cobb's Islands in Northamp-
11. See 1845-46 Va. Acts 40; 1846-47 Va. Acts 32; 1847-48 Va. Acts 67; 1848-49 Va. Acts
58.
12. VA. CODE ch. 162, § 2 (1849); id. ch. 22, §§ 2-3 (military exemptions); id. ch. 57, § 1
(promulgating authority of Code).
13. See 3 REPORT OF REVISORS OF THE CODE OF 1849 (1948).
14. See 1852-53 Va. Acts 43.
15. See id.
16. 1883-84 Va. Acts 27.
17. 1887-88 Va. Acts 124.
18. 1891-92 Va. Acts 1084.
19. 1908 Va. Acts 677.
20. 1930 Va. Acts 628.
21. 1928 Va. Acts 1029-30.
22. It seems that the General Assembly never could decide how to spell "Saxis". See, e.g.,
1878-79 Va. Acts 337 ("Syxes"); 1891-92 Va. Acts 1085 ("Sexes"); 1893-94 Va. Acts 380
("Syxas"); 1922 Va. Acts 756 ("Saxes"); 1928 Va. Acts 1030 ("Saces"); 1930 Va. Acts 628
("Saxis").
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ton County; and Gwynns Island in Mathews County. 3 Interest-
ingly, these persons were exempted only for petit jury duty; grand
jury service remained a requirement. As with other exemptions,
the absence of legislative history leaves us to speculate that public
participation in grand juries was sufficiently important to require a
different result in striking the balance between citizen inconve-
nience and civic duty.
The growth of exemptions continued into the mid-1970's when it
reached its zenith. By this time, the exempted ranks had swelled to
include fruit growers, 24 septuagenarians,2 5 railroad employees,26
veterinarians,2 7 airline pilots, 28 deputy sheriffs, 29 state police,30 jus-
tices of the peace,31 clinical psychologists, 2 and women who did
not wish to serve.3 3 Again, no legislative history exists to illuminate
the reasons for these exemptions. Even if community need was
once a valid justification for some exemptions, it is doubtful that
this rationale can support the breadth and number of exemptions
that existed by the mid-1970's. A far more likely explanation for
the growth of exemptions is simply the exercise of power by special
interest groups.
By the 1970's, the pendulum began to swing back; the range of
exemptions began to shrink. In 1973, the General Assembly elimi-
nated exemptions for telephone and telegraph operators, postmas-
ters and some government positions.3 4 In 1977, the automatic fea-
23. 1878-79 Va. Acts 337. The exemption for Gwymas Island was dropped in 1892. 1891-
92 Va. Acts 1084-85.
24. 1930 Va. Acts 628.
25. 1952 Va. Acts 121.
26. 1946 Va. Acts 56.
27. 1970 Va. Acts 1091-92.




32. 1978 Va. Acts 285-86.
33. 1950 Va. Acts 372-73. The provision relating to the exemption of women was changed
on numerous occasions due to constitutional challenges in Virginia and elsewhere. See, e.g.,
1973 Va. Acts 645, 647 (persons who have legal custody of minors); 1971 Va. Acts 535-36
(women who have legal custody of minor children); 1970 Va. Acts 1091-92 (housewives who
did not want to serve); see also Near v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 20, 116 S.E.2d 85 (1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 873 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 862 (1962); accord Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57 (1961); Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973). The Supreme
Court eventually granted standing for defendants to challenge statutes excluding women
from jury service. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
34. 1973 Va. Acts 645.
[Vol. 20:971974
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ture of many exemptions was eliminated; 35 they were converted to
permissive excuses. Persons falling in these categories could claim
exemption but were not automatically exempted. They could serve
or not as they pleased.
By 1980, the General Assembly had acted to shrink further the
range of exemptions. Eliminated were exemptions for optome-
trists,3 6 ministers,37 undertakers," veterinarians, 39 pharmacists, 0
psychologists,41 and employees of mental hospitals.42 The result of
this latest legislative action is the current scheme: twenty-four ex-
emptions43 or automatic excuses.
44
35. 1977 Va. Acts 690-91.






42. 1978 Va. Acts 500.
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341 (Repl. Vol. 1984) provides:
Who are exempt from jury service.-The following shall be exempt from serving on
juries in civil and criminal cases:
1. The President and Vice President of the United States,
2. The Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the Commonwealth,
3. The members of both houses of Congress,
4. The members of the General Assembly, while in session,
5. Licensed practicing attorneys,
6. Licensed practicing physicians,
7. [Repealed.]
8. Licensed practicing dentists,
9. Officer of any court, provided such officers are in actual service as such and re-
ceive compensation therefor,
10-14. [Repealed.]
15. The judge of any court and members of State Corporation Commission,
16. [Repealed.]
17. Sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, state police, and police and magistrates in counties,
cities and towns,
18-20. [Repealed.]
21. The superintendent of the penitentiary and his assistants and the persons com-
posing the guard,
22-24. [Repealed.]
25. Persons on active duty with the armed forces of the United States or the
Commonwealth,
26-31. [Repealed.]
32. Fire fighters who are full-time, paid members of any fire company or depart-
ment in the Commonwealth.
The citizens of Tangier Island in Accomack County shall be exempt from jury service,
except service on grand juries.
See also 1982 Va. Acts 521.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984) provides:
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As was true with other legislative action on exemptions, no sub-
stantial legislative history exists to explain the elimination of indi-
vidual exemptions or the apparent movement to shrink the range
of exemptions. In the final analysis, the history is not especially
informative. We know that the commonwealth began without ex-
emptions, though it is fair to add that the list of those eligible for
jury service was quite restricted at that time.45 We are left to spec-
ulate that as both the demands for jury service and the list of
those eligible grew, perceptions of community need led to the first
exemptions. Later, growth in exemptions was likely driven primar-
ily by the political power of special interest groups. The recent
trend in the reduction of exemptions is attributable to a growing
awareness that the burdens of jury service and community needs
are outweighed by the values of representative juries and public
participation in the legal system. It is uncertain whether the trend
fueled by these values has the momentum to eliminate the remain-
ing exemptions and return the commonwealth to her original
position.
Who may claim exemption from jury service.-The following may claim exemptions
from serving on juries in civil and criminal cases:
1. Train dispatchers and trainmen employed in train service,
2. Maritime and commercial airline pilots licensed under the laws of the United
States or this State,
3. Customhouse officers,
4. Mariners actually employed in maritime service,
5. All persons while actually engaged in harvesting or securing grain, fruit, potatoes
or hay or in harvesting or securing tobacco, and, during the tobacco marketing season
at any tobacco warehouse, warehousemen and persons employed at such warehouse or
engaged in purchasing or handling of tobacco there at,
6. All professors, tutors and pupils of public or private institutions of learning,
while such institutions are actually in session,
7. Ferrymen actually employed in that capacity,
8. A person who has legal custody of and is necessarily and personally responsible
for a child or children sixteen years of age or younger requiring continuous care by
him during normal court hours,
9. A person who is necessarily and personally responsible for a person having a
physical or mental impairment requiring continuous care by him during normal court
hours,
10. Any person over seventy years of age,
11. Any person whose spouse is summoned to serve on the same jury panel.
See also 1977 Va. Acts 690 (section 8.01-341.1 was assigned by the Virginia Code Commis-
sion, the number in the 1977 act having been § 8-208.6:1).
45. See, e.g., VA. CODE ch. 73, pt. XII (1792) (jurors must be age 21, freeholders, possessed
of a visible estate of at least $300 value for serious cases-felonies, land titles, etc.-$150
value for trials in inferior courts); VA. CODE ch. 162 § 1 (1849) (must be age 21 and own real
or personal property of $100 value).
976
1986] VIRGINIA JURY EXEMPTIONS
III. EXEMPTIONS, REPRESENTATIVENESS AND THE CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court, citing the due process and equal protection
clauses, has developed a standard of jury representativeness. This
constitutional standard mandates that juries be drawn from a fair
cross section of the community.46 While Virginia's current exemp-
tions do not violate this standard, the development and application
of this constitutional doctrine help shed light on the role and effect
of exemptions.
A. The Development of the Fair Cross-Section Principle
Since 1791, the sixth amendment has guaranteed criminal de-
fendants the right to a trial by an "impartial jury., 47 Not until the
1940's did the Supreme Court construe this right to include the
principle that a jury should be drawn from a fair "cross-section" of
the community.4s Four cases decided in that decade established
general standards by which jury representativeness continues to be
judged.49
In Smith v. Texas,50 racially discriminatory jury selection proce-
dures 1 prompted the Court to declare that "in the use of juries as
instruments of public justice. . . the jury [must] be a body truly
46. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48. See, e.g., text accompanying note 60.
49. Though not refined until the 1940's, the principle that juries should be representive of
the community was recognized by the Supreme Court at least as early as 1879. In Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the Court held systematic exclusion of blacks from
criminal juries to be a violation of a black defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.
It was unfair, the Court said, to subject the defendant to the judgment of a panel of jurors
systematically purged of all those who held the same legal status in society as the defendant
held. Id. at 308-09.
For additional information on the development of representativeness and the fair cross
section principle, see generally J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN
COMMITTMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (1977); Ashby, Juror Selection and the Sixth
Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1137 (1977); Daughtrey,
Cross Sectionalism in Jury Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L.
REV. 1 (1975); Comment, Representative Cross Section Standard: Another Sixth Amend-
ment Fundamental Right, 21 Loy. L. REV. 995 (1975); Comment, Sixth Amendment Right
to a Fair Cross Section of the Community-A Change in Emphasis, 41 Mo. L. REV. 446
(1976).
50. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
51. In Smith, the petitioner, a black man charged with rape, challenged the composition
of the grand jury which indicted him on the basis that, although blacks constituted twenty
percent of his community, only five were summoned to serve over a seven-year period, while
494 white men were summoned in the same period. Id. at 128-29.
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representative of the community. '52 Two years later, in Glasser v.
United States,55 the Court again stressed that juries must be truly
representative. In Glasser, all women who were not members of the
League of Women Voters were allegedly excluded from jury ser-
vice.54 The Court stated that jury selection procedures "which do
not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross section of the
community" are violative of the guarantee of an impartial jury.55
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 5' and Ballard v. United States,5 7
decided in 1946, further developed the fair cross section principle.
These decisions established that intentional and systematic exclu-
sion of identifiable segments of the community, such as daily wage
earners in Thiel5  and women in Ballard, was impermissible be-
cause the exclusion would deprive the jury of the broad base it was
designed to have.59 Perhaps Justice Murphy best stated the guid-
ing principles of jury selection when he wrote in Thiel:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. This
does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representa-
tives of all economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographic
groups of the community; frequently such complete representation
would be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall
be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional ex-
clusion of any of these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact
52. Id. at 130.
53. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
54. Although petitioners failed to offer sufficient proof of their allegations, the Court rec-
ognized that such a practice would violate the guarantee of an impartial jury because a jury
cannot be the organ of any one special class. Id. at 86.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
57. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
58. In Thiel, a negligence action against respondent railroad, the petitioner moved to
strike out the entire jury panel alleging that "employees and those in the poorer classes"
were underrepresented, thereby giving majority representation to "those having the em-
ployer's viewpoint." Testimony taken at a hearing on petitioner's motion revealed that both
the clerk of the court and the jury commission excluded from the jury lists all persons who
worked for a daily wage, because the judges would usually let those men go on the basis of
financial hardship. The Court held that, as "there was no effort, no intention, to determine
in advance which individual members of the daily wage earning class would suffer an undue
hardship," the practice operated to systematically and automatically exclude the entire
class. 328 U.S. at 224.
59. See Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195.
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that those eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum
of society."
These four cases applied the fair cross section principle only to
federal jury selection procedures in criminal6 ' and civil cases.62 In
1968, however, Duncan v. Louisiana63 extended the sixth amend-
ment requirement of trial by an "impartial jury" to state criminal
proceedings.6 4 Building upon this foundation, Taylor v. Louisi-
ana65 held explicitly that the fair cross section principle was appli-
cable to state criminal proceedings by virtue of the sixth and four-
teenth amendments .6  No case has extended this principle to state
civil proceedings, although the Supreme Court thought it suffi-
ciently important in civil cases to impose it upon federal civil trials
through its supervisory powers.67
The Virginia Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
right to be tried by an impartial jury, 8 paralleling the federal Con-
stitution's guarantee. Virginia statutes set forth the same jury se-
lection procedure for criminal and civil trials.6 9 In practice, there-
fore, Virginia's civil litigants enjoy the same safeguards as do
criminal defendants.
B. Application of the Fair Cross Section Principle
The initial step in jury selection is to prepare a "source" list or
lists. To be fully representative, these lists of prospective jurors
should include the entire qualified adult population of a given ju-
60. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
61. See Ballard, 329 U.S. 187; Glasser, 315 U.S. 60. In both of these cases, the defendant-
petitioners were charged with federal crimes and alleged violations of their sixth amend-
ment rights.
62. The Court noted in Thiel the importance of the cross section principle to both crimi-
nal and civil trials. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220. Thiel imposed the requirement on federal civil
proceedings through the Court's supervisory power over the federal courts but did not de-
clare it a constitutional requirement of all civil jury proceedings. Id. at 225.
63. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
64. Id. at 154.
65. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
66. Id. at 526-30.
67. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 225.
68. VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 states that "in criminal prosecutions a man.. shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage." (emphasis added).
"Vicinage" corresponds to the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the venue of the
crime is laid. Newberry v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 819, 823, 66 S.E. 2d 841, 843 (1951).
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-345 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
1986]
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risdiction.70 However, no practical method exists by which to
choose prospective jurors from the population at large. In conse-
quence, a prepared "source" list must be used.
In Virginia and elsewhere, voter registration rolls are the pri-
mary source list 7 1 from which master jury lists or "wheels '7 2 are
compiled. These rolls have the virtue of being readily available.
Some groups, however, such as non-whites, women, poor persons,
and young adults, are under-represented on the voter rolls because
they do not register to vote in as high a proportion as white
males.73 Additionally, registered voters comprise little more than
half of the eligible community.74 As a result, jury lists compiled
exclusively from voter registration rolls often fail to be representa-
tive or inclusive7 5 of the population they are supposed to reflect.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 114-24.
71. Many states provide for the exclusive use of voter registration rolls. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 39-101 (Cum. Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01 (West Supp. 1986); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 609.1 (West Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1304 (West 1981);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-15-402 (1985); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-9-8 to -9 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-140 (Law Co-op. 1976); TEx. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 62.001 (Vernon 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.060 (Cum. Supp. 1986). Virginia and
several other states provide for the use of voter registration rolls and "other sources" which
may be adopted by the court system. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-345 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see
also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-106 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4505 (Cum. Supp. 1984);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-11 (1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-2 (Repl. Vol. 1981). Some other states
specify what other sources, such as driver's license lists, may or are required to be used. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-57 (Cum. Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. § 09.02.050 (1973); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 204.7 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-217 (West 1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 78, para. 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-162 (Supp. 1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1628 (Repl. Vol. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.08 (Baldwin 1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 18 (West Supp. 1985) (drivers license lists will be added begin-
ning in 1987).
Virginia is one of the few states which maintains both driver's license and voter registra-
tion lists at the state level. Efforts are underway to provide combined lists to interested
courts. See G. MUNSTERMAN & J. MUNSTERMAN, A SURVEY OF THE JURY SYSTEMS IN VIRGINIA
3 (1983) (a study performed by the Center for Jury Studies of the National Center for State
Courts for the Office of the Executive Secretary, Supreme Court of Virginia) [hereinafter
MUNSTERMAN SURVEY]; JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE
AND MANAGEMENT IN VIRGINIA 11 (1985) [hereinafter VIRGINIA STANDARDS].
72. A master jury list, sometimes referred to as a master wheel, is a roster of potential
jurors for a particular term of court drawn usually by random selection from the master
lists. From the wheel, names are selected for qualification and summoning. See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 184 (1983) [herein-
after ABA STANDARDS]. Procedures vary greatly from state to state as to when qualifications
are applied to the master jury list. See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 77-109.
73. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 25 & n.8.
74. In Virginia only 62.2% of the over-18 population is registered to vote-65.4% of the
white population, 49.7% of the black population. VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 11.
See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 25.
75. Representativeness is a concept used to express the degree to which cognizable or
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For this reason, commentators and some courts have condemned
this practice. 6
Once the master jury list or "wheel" has been randomly selected
from the source lists, 77 qualifications and exemptions operate to
yield the available juror pool for a given term.78 This process has
been sanctioned by the Supreme Court which has consistently held
that "[t]he States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications
for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions so long as it
may be fairly said that the jury lists or panels are representative of
identifiable groups in the population are reflected in the juror source lists. Inclusiveness
refers to the percent of entire over-18 population of a jurisdiction which is included in the
source list. For example, if a voter registration included 35% of every cognizable group, it
would be very representative, but not very inclusive of the entire community. See ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 25-26, 173-76, 182, 188.
The ABA and the Judicial Council of Virginia have adopted identical standards which
express the policy that "[t]he jury source list should be as representative and should be as
inclusive of the adult population as is feasible." VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 11;
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 23. See generally Dogin & Tevelin, Jury Systems of the
Eighties: Toward a Fairer Cross-Section and Increased Efficiency, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 939
(1980); Annotation, Validity of Requirement or Practice of Selecting Prospective Jurors
Exclusively From Lists of Registered Voters, 80 A.L.R.3d 869 (1977); Kairys, Kadane &
Lehoczky, Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REv.
776 (1977); Munsterman & Munsterman, The Search for Jury Representativeness, 11 JusT.
Sys. J. 59 (1986).
This, of course, is to reject, as do the authors, the notion that people who lack civic inter-
est are properly left out of civic affairs.
76. See, e.g., California v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984) (California Supreme Court overturned a first degree murder
conviction because the jury pool, selected solely from voter registration lists, did not re-
present a fair cross section of the community); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 272, 583
P.2d 748, 759, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 900 (1978) (noting that "[o]bviously, if. ..[the source]
list is not representative of a cross-section of the community, the process is defective ab
initio"). See generally Comment, Jury Pools Drawn from Voter Registration Lists May Not
Provide a Fair-Cross-Section; People v. Harris, 15 CUMB. L. REv. 555 (1985); Kairys, Kadane
& Lehoczky, supra note 75. Cf. Comment, The Constitutionality of Calling Jurors Exclu-
sively From Voter Registration Lists, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1266 (1980) (suggesting that exclu-
sive use of voter registration lists infringes on the right to vote and is thereby unconstitu-
tional); accord J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 91 (stating that many people fail to register in
order to avoid jury service).
77. In Virginia, jury commissioners are required to employ random selection techniques.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-345 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see also Federal Jury Selection and Service Act
of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1864 (1968). Both the ABA and the Judicial Council of Virginia have
adopted standards which require random selection procedures to be used in "(i) selecting
persons to be summoned for jury service; (ii) assigning prospective jurors to panels; and (iii)
calling prospective jurors for voir dire." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 36; VIRGINIA
STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 12. But see J. Coulter, Jury Management 8 (1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (suggesting that there is a conflict between "pure random selection" and
the goal of the fair cross-section principle in that random selection from the source list
perpetuates any biases which are inherent in the source list).
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-345 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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the community. 1 79 Yet there is some reason to suspect that the
result of this process does not yield juries representative of the
community. For example, some Richmond Circuit Court data for
the first ten months of 1986 suggest that males generally, and
white males especially, may be underrepresented s0
To be sure, the disqualification of convicted felons,81 persons un-
able to communicate in English, 2 non-citizens,s" minors, 4 the
blind, 5 and the deaf8 6 "remove[s] from the jury room qualities of
human nature and varieties of human experience. 8s7 These dis-
qualifications arguably impair representativeness. On balance,
though, they seem justified for they reflect the overriding concerns
that jurors be competent to perform their challenging task 8 and be
deserving of the trust.
79. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (emphasis added).
80. Records maintained by Chief Judge Thomas N. Nance, Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, regarding 26 juries indicate the following panel and jury compositions:
Panels: 25 of 26 were majority black; 22 of 26 were majority female. Juries: 24 of 26
were majority black; 22 of 26 were majority female.
Memorandum from Chief Judge Thomas N. Nance to Judge James M. Lumpkin (November
21, 1986) (study conducted from March, 1986 to November 21, 1986).
Records maintained by Judge James M. Lumpkin, Circuit Court of the City of Richmond,
Virginia, regarding 53 juries indicate the following panel and jury compositions:
Panels: 44 of 53 were majority black, 3 were tied 10-10; 29 of 53 were majority female,
11 were tied 10-10. Juries: 46 of 53 were majority black, 3 were tied 6-6; 43 of 53 were
majority female, 5 were tied 6-6.
Letter from Judge James M. Lumpkin to T.S. Ellis, III (November 20, 1986) (study con-
ducted from January 1, 1986 through October 31, 1986).
81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-338 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note
72, at 47 (Standard No. 3); VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 13 (Standard No. 3).
82. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 47; VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 13.
83. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-337 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note
72, at 47; VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 13.
84. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-337 (RepL Vol. 1984); see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note
72, at 47; VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 13.
85. The blind are usually disqualified on the ground that they are unable to see the ex-
pressions of the witnesses and are thus unable to judge the witnesses' demeanor. See, e.g.,
Rhodes v. State, 128 Ind. 189, 27 N.E. 866 (1891) (juror with defective eyesight found in-
competent to serve since he could not see the face of the defendant, the expressions of the
witnesses, nor the exhibits). See generally 47 AM. JuR. 2d Jury § 108 (1964).
86. See, e.g., Lindsey v. State, 189 Tenn. 355, 225 S.W.2d 533 (1949) (juror with impaired
hearing not disqualified because counsel had failed to challenge juror's qualifications prior
to trial, he was given seat closest to witness, and he made no complaint during trial that he
could not hear); cf. Annotation, Deafness of Juror as Grounds for Impeaching Verdict, or
Securing New Trial or Reversal on Appeal, 15 A.L.R.2d 534 (1951).
87. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972). Justice Marshall's full quote is reproduced
in the text at note 115.
88. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 47; VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 13;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1968); UNIFORM JURY SELECTION AND SERVICE ACT § 8(b) (1971).
See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 131-33.
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Occupational exemptions also impair representativeness. These
exemptions are unrelated to the public interest in ensuring juror
competency. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized a jus-
tification for these exemptions in the purportedly vital role played
by the exempted persons in society. As early as 1906, in Rawlins v.
Georgia,8 9 the Court upheld occupational exemptions, noting that:
[I]f the state .. .should exclude certain classes on the bona fide
ground that it was for the good of the community that their regular
work should not be interrupted, there is nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent it. The exemption of lawyers, ministers of
the gospel, doctors, and engineers of railroad trains . . .is of old
standing and not uncommon in the United States.90
The fair cross section principle prohibits jury selection proce-
dures that result in the systematic exclusion of cognizable groups.9 1
Claimed violations of the principle are judged by a three-part test
fashioned by the Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri:
9 2
[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross section re-
quirement, the defendant must show: (1) that the group alleged to
be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which juries are to be
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection
process."'
Typically, the threshold and often determinative issue in applying
the test is whether a group is sufficiently "cognizable, ' 9 4 "identifi-
able" 5 or "distinctive"9 for its exclusion to be constitutionally im-
89. 201 U.S. 638 (1906) (exemptions upheld against a due process challenge).
90. Id. at 640. Although Rawlins was decided before the development of the fair cross
section principle, subsequent decisions acknowledge that there is much leeway in the appli-
cation of the principle. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534. Therefore, reasonable exemptions are allow-
able so long as the jury lists remain fairly representative of the community. Id.
91. See, e.g., Taylor 419 U.S. at 530; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220
(1946).
92. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
93. Id. at 364.
94. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 137, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974)
(superceded.by statute as stated in United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, Petrov. v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2037 (1985)).
95. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; Hamling, 418 U.S. at 137.
96. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
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permissible. Groups held to satisfy this threshold criterion include
daily wage earners,9 7 common laborers,9  blacks,99 women, 100 His-
panic-Americans, 1'0 native Americans, °2 college students, profes-
sors and administrators, 03 young adults10 4 and, until recently,
those who oppose the death penalty.10 5 The rationale for recogniz-
ing these groups as sufficiently distinctive is apparently that indi-
viduals within each group have a singular outlook or world view
based on shared common experiences, ideas, attitudes or commu-
nity of interests.10 6 If a particular singular outlook, or weltan-
97. See, e.g., Thiel, 328 U.S. at 224; People v. White, 43 Cal. 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954), cert.
denied, White v. California, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
98. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 182 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
99. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of
Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940).
100. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. 357; Taylor, 419 U.S. 522.
101. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1975).
103. See, e.g., State v. Jenison, 122 R.I. 142, 405 A.2d 3 (1979) (grand jury).
104. See, e.g., Hamling, 418 U.S. 87 (assumed arguendo that young people were an identi-
fiable group but found no systematic exclusion); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st
Cir. 1970).
105. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) stated that the proper inquiry was whether
the juror's views on captial punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the perform-
ance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath," and held that
it need not be shown, before excluding a juror, that he would automatically vote against the
death sentence. Id. at 424 (citation omitted). Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) held that
exclusion of prospective jurors from service because of their views on capital punishment
"on 'any broader basis' than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths" violated the
defendant's sixth amendment rights. Id. at 47-48. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1963) held that a venireman could not be excluded from a jury merely because he expressed
"qualms" about the death sentence.
In the past the argument was advanced that those who have inflexible scruples against
capital punishment (and could thus be excluded from the sentencing phase of a trial under
Witherspoon) constitute a "distinctive" group and could not be systematically excluded
from the guilt/innocence phase. Until 1986, the circuit courts were in conflict on this issue.
See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Keeten v. Garrison, 742
F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984) (those irrevocably opposed to death penalty may be excluded
from non-bifurcated trial); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 597 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979) (such persons would not be impartial fact-finders at guilt
stage). Grigsby was reversed by Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) ("death qualifi-
cation" not violative of suspect's sixth or fourteenth amendment rights). The Supreme
Court, with Lockhart, resolved this conflict among the circuits.
106. In State v. Williams, 659 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), the Supreme Court of
Missouri discussed the attributes of cognizable groups:
Generally, though, the segment of the population in question must have cohesion.
There must be a quality or attribute that defines the group. There must be a common
thread running through the group that reflects a basic similarity in attitudes, ideas or
experiences. Finally, the group must possess a community of interest which may not
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shauung, is underrepresented in the jury by virtue of systematic
exclusion of a distinctive group in the jury selection process, the
other parts of the Duren test are satisfied and the fair cross section
principle is violated.
10 7
In Virginia, groups such as attorneys and physicians0 8 are statu-
torily exempted and thus not represented at all.'09 Hence, parts
two and three of the Duren test are satisfied. The key issue thus
becomes whether the occupational exemptions operate to exclude
any "cognizable" or "identifiable" group. Courts that have ad-
dressed this issue have unanimously agreed that occupational
groups, such as attorneys, physicians, dentists, etc., do not re-
present a cognizable class or classes.11' 0 Though the persons in
these exempted categories may be numerous, courts apparently
conclude that they are not linked by any common thread or simi-
larity of attitudes or experience. As a constitutional matter, the
Supreme Court concluded that "[i]t would not appear that such
exemptions would pose substantial threats that the remaining pool
of jurors would not be representative of the community."
111
The automatic excuses provided under Virginia law,"12 in which
those eligible "may claim exemption" from jury service," 3 would
appear to be even less threatening to the fair cross section princi-
ple than exemptions. Their exclusion is elective, not compulsory.
Thus, underrepresentation of these citizens is not "due to system-
atic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process."' 4
be represented by other segments of the populace.
Id. at 780 (citations omitted). The court concluded that attorneys did not constitute such a
group. Id. at 781.
107. Systematic exclusion was found in cases discussed supra notes 96-100, 102 and ac-
companying text. No exclusion was found in cases discussed supra notes 101 and 103 and
accompanying text.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see supra note 43.
109. Section 8.01-345 of the Code of Virginia requires the jury commissioner to apply the
statutory exemptions to the master list. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-345 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
110. See, e.g., People v. Cohen, 12 Cal. App. 3d 298, 90 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1970); State v.
Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 364 A.2d 186 (1975); Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S.W.2d 924
(Ky. 1984); State v. Williams, 659 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); Commonwealth v.
Kloch, 230 Pa. Super. 563, 327 A.2d 375 (1974). See generally Legislative Comment, The
Questionable Validity of the Automatic Exemption of Attorneys from Jury Service, 14 U.
RICH. L. REv. 837 (1980).
111. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 534.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see supra note 44.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
114. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
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IV. EXEMPTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY
Occupational exemptions and excuses may not violate the consti-
tutional standard for representativeness, but they unquestionably
impair it. The precise effect of this impairment is unknown and,
indeed, very likely unknowable. Justice Marshall has put this point
well:
[W]hen any large and identifiable segment of the community is ex-
cluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not neces-
sary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a
class in order to conclude, as we do, that their exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected
importance in any case that may be presented. 1 5
On this view, representativeness has a functional aspect; it is im-
portant for the effect it may have on the jury's fact-finding process.
This point is not open to serious dispute. Exclusion of distinctive
groups necessarily limits the range of perspectives that are brought
to bear on the case. But this functional aspect of representative-
ness seems not to have been the sole driving force in the constitu-
tional development of the doctrine. Most of the groups held to be
"distinctive" are historically disadvantaged groups. And the consti-
tutional status of these groups as "distinctive" owes as much to
history as it does to the functional importance of
representativeness.116
This illustrates the difficulty of identifying cognizable groups. In
the past, the determination has been made largely on the basis of
the historical, social, economic, or cultural position of the group."'
But a weltanschauung can be influenced by shared interest,
whether vocational or avocational. Distinctive groups, especially on
particular issues, can be identified by a variety of fac-
115. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972).
116. Consider, for example, the effect of a physician exemption in a case where health
care providers are charged with withholding life sustaining care from a severely afflicted
newborn or an aged, incompetent and comatose patient. Another telling example is the ef-
fect of the physician exemption in which a health care provider stands accused of Medicare
or Medicaid fraud.
117. The impact of quasi-suspect classes of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence are
clearly cognizable groups of this type. Daily wage earners, common laborers, and young
adults are identifiable on this basis as well. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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tors-hobbies, l ls jobs,""" ethnic background, educational exper-
iences, religion, family structure120 and the like. From a functional
point of view, therefore, the constitutional standard of representa-
tiveness is just a starting point. Representativeness is a continuum.
Somewhere along this continuum lies the constitutional minimum.
But this minimum governs only what must be done; a legislature
must consider what ought to be done. The functional value that
underlies the constitutional standard influences the rest of the con-
tinuum as well.
More important, perhaps, than the functional aspect of repre-
sentativeness is the aspect of civil participation. 2" The jury is
more than a fact-finding tool. It is an important civic engine for
involving citizens in the apparatus that governs them. An apprecia-
tion of this is hardly fostered by making jury service a nuisance
which must be borne only by those in "unimportant"
occupations.
1 22
Omission from juries of anyone in the twenty-four categories eli-
gible for exemption or excuse in Virginia cultivates two insidious
evils: first, a public attitude that jury service is unimportant, a lei-
sure pursuit for those with the luxury of idle time; and second, a
public perception that is misinformed about the administration of
justice because the media is its only source of data.
1 23
More comprehensive public involvement in the jury process, and
118. For example, an individual's preference of leisure activity might lead him to join the
Sierra Club or the National Rifle Association; his particular view on political issues might
find him in the Federalist Society.
119. Job concerns are often channeled through labor unions or professional aassociations.
120. Whether a person grew up with both parents in the home, for example, can affect his
attitudes.
121. Indeed, if fact-finding accuracy were the only goal, an unrepresentative elite jury
might be superior to a representative one. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 13-16 (dis-
cussing the existing sentiment in favor of elite juries). "Blue Ribbon" juries are available in
Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-362 (Repl. Vol. 1984) (court in civil case may summon
such jurors as it shall designate).
122. This reference to important people brings to mind the remark Lord Campbell is said
to have made when Charles Dickens failed to appear for jury service:
The name of the illustrious Charles Dickens has been called on jury, but he has not
answered. If his great Chancery suit had still been going on [Jarndyce v. Jarndyce], I
certainly would have excused him; but, as that is over, he might have done us the
honor of attending here, that he might have seen how we went on at common law.
HEARD CuIuosrms oF THE LAW REPORTERS 106 (1871).
123. History gives us another example of the ill effect of an exemption. It may be thought
singular to suppose that the exemption from serving on juries is the foundation of the vulgar
error, that a surgeon or butcher (from the barbarity of their businesses) may be challenged
as jurors. D. BARRINGTON, OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORE ANzcEiNT STATUTES 442 (3d ed. 1769).
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public perception of this involvement, would confer more dignity
on jury service. There is no reason a governor should not serve. 24
On the contrary, leaders should set the example in this context as
in others. What more potent symbol of the importance of jury ser-
vice is there than the picture of a governor reporting for jury ser-
vice. 125 And if familiarity with the system serves to breed contempt
because of perceived faults, the electorate, having served on juries
and venires, will at least possess the knowledge and understanding
of the system necessary to deal with its infirmities.
Finally, a jury brings citizens together in an undertaking that
emphasizes the common beliefs and values upon which the judicial
system rests. This, too, is at least as important as the functional
aspect of representativeness. Perhaps no other of the few civic du-
ties required of Americans is so centered upon the shared aspects
of our culture. In a society that is so diverse, so fragmented in al-
most every other way-religious, political, economic, social, philo-
sophical-such a unifying exercise should not be set aside for the
sake of convenience.
In sum, the functional and participatory aspects of representa-
tiveness militate in favor of inclusiveness and for the abolition of
exemptions. Exemptions deprive the judicial system of the views of
significant segments of the population. It might even be argued
that those most active in the affairs of society, those likely to be
the best informed, are the very persons absent from the jury room
due to exemptions. The remedy is abolition.
V. JURY REFORM: ABOLITION OF EXEMPTIONS
The General Assembly must, of course, ensure that Virginia's
jury selection procedures comply with the constitutional minimum.
But it should do more; it should strive to achieve the broadest
public jury participation possible. Indeed, the commonwealth
should impose upon itself a "compelling state interest/least bur-
densome alternative" standard against which to judge exemptions,
even though such exemptions may not fall below the constitution-
124. The Governors of California, Massachusetts, and Colorado have served. STATE OF
NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, INTERIM REPORT OF THE JURY MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 39 (Dec. 1984). The Governor of Connecticut is scheduled to serve. Virginian-
Pilot and The Ledger-Star, Nov. 30, 1986, at A2, col. 1.
125. The analogy comes to mind of government leaders urging people to vote and then
doing so themselves to set an example.
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ally required minimum. Judged against this standard, Virginia's
exemptions and automatic excuses fail. No compelling state inter-
est supports them128 and, as we shall see, their abolition can be
accomplished while, at the same time, minimizing burdens on the
public.
Nor is this a novel conclusion. It is widely recognized that ex-
emptions, such as those in Virginia, operate to exclude a significant
portion of the community from the pool of jurors in many areas
127
and should therefore be eliminated. The American Bar Association
(ABA) has led the way in recommending abolition. Its Standard
No. 6 states that "all automatic excuses or exemptions from jury
service should be eliminated.' 28 The ABA's rationale for this rec-
ommendation appears'in its Standard No. 1, which notes that:
"[t]he opportunity for jury service should not be denied or limited
on the basis of race, national origin, gender, age, religious belief,
income, occupation or any other factor that discriminates against a
cognizable group in the jurisdiction."' 29 It is not surprising, there-
fore, that a majority of states have eliminated or severely limited
the availability of exemptions. 130
126. Traditionally, occupational exemptions have been justified primarily on the ground
that "it was for the good of the community that [the exempted persons'] regular work
should not be interrupted." Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638, 640 (1906). See 71 A.B.A.J. 27
(May 1985) (quoting G. Thomas Munsterman, director of the Center for Jury Studies of the
National Center for State Courts: "The orignal reason for exempting professions was com-
munity hardship. Trials could last a week or two and the feeling was the local doctor or
lawyer couldn't be spared." No doubt this was true when there were few doctors or lawyers
or dentists or others who performed services vital to developing communities, especially
considering how prolonged periods of jury service could be). See also Graham & Pope, One
Day/One Trial or a One Week Term of Jury Service: The Misleading Marketing of Modern
Jury Management Systems, 45 Mo. L. REv. 255, 255 (1980) (noting that terms of service
ranged from weeks to months). Although the number of doctors and lawyers is sufficient
(indeed arguably excessive) to handle today's needs, nonetheless, it remains true that, were
these persons prevented from performing their services for an extended period of time, they
would suffer, their patients or clients would suffer, and hence, their communities would suf-
fer. Thus, the continuing validity, if any, of the community-need justification depends upon
the length of jury service required.
127. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 60-61; Coulter, supra note 77, at 12; see
generally VAN DYKE, supra note 49, at 111-37.
128. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 60.
129. See id. at 16.
130. See ALA. CODE § 12-16-62 (Cum. Supp. 1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-202, 203
Historical Note (Repl. Vol. 1975); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 202 (West 1982) (Repealed); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN § 51-219 (West 1985) (repeal effective 9/1/86); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504
(Cum. Supp. 1984) (policemen, firemen, members of the Delaware State Guard, public of-
ficers actively engaged in the performance of official duties, and others where the Superior
Court finds an exemption to be in the public interest); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.08 (West Supp.
1986) (Repealed. This section had held practicing attorneys exempt.); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-
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Despite all this, Virginia has yet to follow suit. The Judicial
Council, while concurring with the ABA on policy, has failed to
follow the ABA in recommending the elimination of exemptions
and automatic excuses. 13 1 The General Assembly, at the 1986 regu-
lar session, similarly demonstrated its reluctance to follow the
ABA by tabling a bill designed to abolish all exemptions and auto-
matic excuses. 132 Reasons for this reluctance are unclear. Very
likely, it grows out of a concern that elimination of all exemptions
and excuses may result in burdensome jury service for those no
longer exempt. Pessimists doubtless suggest that doctors and other
providers of vital services, if not exempted, would have to spend
weeks on jury duty.
This concern, whatever its validity, cannot be ignored. There is,
undeniably, some nexus between the length of jury service and the
need for exemptions. 33 Jury exemption abolition is only one side
of the coin; the obverse of the same coin is the necessity to imple-
21-1 (1985); IDAHO CODE §2-211 (Repl. Vol. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-4-5-7 (Burns 1985)
(over 65); IOWA CODE ANN. § 607.2 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-159 (Repl. Vol.
1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 29A-090 (Repl. Vol. 1985); MD. CTS: & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 8-209
(Repl. Vol. 1984) (Military Personnel, over 70); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 234 §§ 1-1A (Michie/
Law Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1307a (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN §
593.44 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-23 (Cum. Supp. 1986) (attorneys and
physicians); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (Repl. Vol. 1985) (judges, clerks of court, sheriffs and
jailors); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-2 (Cum. Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-6 (Cum. Supp.
1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-10 (Repl. Vol. 1973); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2313.12, .16
(Baldwin 1982); TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.106 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (person with custody
of child under 10, students); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-14 (Cum. Supp. 1986); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 2.36.080 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (repealed 1971 WASH. LAWS ch. 81 § 103); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 52-1-10 (Cum. Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-103 (Repl. Vol. 1977) (po-
licemen, firemen, public officials) (source list provided by Center for Jury Studies of the
National Center for State Courts).
131. Standard no. 6 of the VIRGINIA STANDARDS, entitled "Exemption, Excuse and Defer-
ral" is conspicuously silent on the topic of abolition of exemptions. Compare VIRGINIA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 71, at 16 with ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 60. Cf. Coulter, supra
note 77, at 12 (some confusion must have existed as to the Judicial Council's final recom-
mendation because the Hon. Mr. Coulter, a member of the Advisory Committee on Juror
Use and Management, was under the impression that the VIRGINIA STANDARDS eliminated all
exemptions).
132. The Parkerson-Emick Bill, S.77, 1986 Sess., Virginia, provided for the repeal of the
exemption statutes, §§ 8.01-341 and -341.1; See supra notes 43-44. As passed by the Senate,
this bill enlarged § 8.01-341.2 to permit deferral not just for "occupational inconvenience,"
but for any particular inconvenience. Even so, the House Courts of Justice Committee voted
10-6 to table the measure for the 1986 legislative session. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb.
21, 1986, at A6, col. 6.
133. This nexus is recognized in Massachusetts, where in 1979 reduction of terms of ser-




ment a system designed to minimize inconvenience to jurors. With-
out some means of ensuring that jury service will not be unduly
burdensome, it is doubtful that the abolition of exemptions would
be viewed as justified. This close functional relationship between
jury exemption abolition and reduction or jury service require-
ments is well recognized. The ABA and the Virginia Judicial Coun-
cil both note that:
reducing the term of service is essential to achieving a representative
and inclusive jury. Long terms of service disrupt domestic schedules,
personal plans, and business activities, thereby discouraging many
prospective jurors from wanting to serve. The economic hardship
and extreme inconvenience created by lengthy terms lead to an in-
crease in the number of requests to be excused from jury duty.
13 4
In addressing this problem, the ABA and the Judicial Council
again agree on policy: the period of service and availability "should
be the shortest period consistent with the needs of justice. ' 135 ABA
and Judicial Council agreement on a policy of shortening jury ser-
vice is as unsurprising as popular agreement on apple pie and
motherhood. But it is similarly not surprising that agreement is
more elusive when it comes to concrete implementation of the
policy.
In the ABA's view, the policy calls for implementation of the
system of one day or one trial, whichever is longer.'36 The Judicial
Council disagrees, recommending instead that "persons not be re-
quired to report for more than seven days of roll call or to serve on
more than three trials per term. 137 Additionally, the Judicial
Council fixed the term of availability at one month, except in those
rural areas where infrequent jury trials may dictate a longer pe-
riod. The ABA, in sharp contrast, provides for jurors to remain
134. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 56; VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 14.
135. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 55; VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 14
(emphasis added).
136. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 55 (Standard No. 5(a)).
137. VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 14 (Standard No. 5(a)). Apparently, the Judi-
cial Council believed that variances in the number of terms of court and the population
differences between rural and urban areas were not suitable for implementing a one-day!
one-trial system; see Coulter, supra note 77, at 14. But see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72,
at 55 (Commentary for Standard 5 provides that one-day/one-trial should be used where
feasible and makes provison for a term of one week in those rural areas where such a system
is not feasible).
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available for only two weeks. 138 Closer examination of these pro-
posals helps point the way to an appropriate solution for Virginia,
a solution that should accompany and support abolition of
exemptions.
The one-day/one-trial system'3 9 is at the forefront of modern
jury management systems. Under this system, a juror's term of ser-
vice ends at the completion of one trial or, if a juror is not selected
to serve on a trial, at the end of one day. Although some jurors
would have to return on subsequent days because their trials or
their voir dire process consumed more than one day,140 the major-
ity of jurors would complete their service at the end of one day.'
4 '
Since 1971, when Houston adopted the one-day/one-trial sys-
tem,"' over sixty court systems in at least twenty-six states and
four federal districts have implemented the system in hopes of en-
joying its potential benefits. 43 One-day/one-trial clearly achieves
its primary objective, which is to minimize the time requirement of
jury service. This, in turn, renders occupational exemptions unnec-
essary and greatly reduces the need for excuses based on inconve-
nience and hardship, thereby resulting in more representative and
inclusive jury panels. 4 4  One-day/one-trial should also provide
higher quality decision making 14  and produce greater juror
138. Compare VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 71, at 14 (Standard No. 5(b)) with ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 55 (Standard No. 5(b)).
139. Although the system is more commonly referred to as one-day/one-trial, some juris-
dictions have noted juror reluctance to serve on "one trial" because of the overselling of
"one day." See, e.g., Overselling "One Day", Center for Jury Studies Newsletter, Vol. 4, No.
2, p.4 (March 1982). To avoid this problem, cities such as Baltimore have begun publicizing
their systems as "one trial or one day." Id. This article follows their example.
140. Juror inconvenience might be reduced by holding a single voir dire for the selection
of multiple juries.
141. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 55-57. See generally Canham, One Day/One
Trial, 16 JUDGES' J. 34 (Summer 1977); K. Carlson, A Holper & D. Whitcomb, An Exem-
plary Project: One Day/One Trial Jury System-Wayne County, Michigan (1977); One
Day/One Trial, Center for Jury Studies Newsletter, No. 1 (Jan. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
Newsletter].
142. See Newsletter, supra note 140, at 2.
143. According to the National Center for Jury Studies, at least 18% of the 18-years-and-
older population reside in jurisdictions with one-day/one-trial terms of service. Not all
jurisidictions using the one-day/one-trial system are known, so this is a conservative esti-
mate. Four federal districts use this system: the Middle District of Alabama, the District of
Nevada, and the Eastern and Middle Districts of North Carolina.
144. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 56; Before and After One-Day/One-Trial,
Center for Jury Studies Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 4 (July 1981). The reduced period of service
would probably reduce even the hardship on the residents of Tangier Island. They are al-
ready required to serve on grand juries. See supra note 43.
145. Many commentators believe that jurors who have been exposed to several trials be-
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satisfaction.
146
Judicial Council recommendations for periods of juror service
are more burdensome than those recommended by the ABA. This
may explain the reluctance of the Council and the General Assem-
bly to eliminate exemptions. Arguably, it is unnecessarily burden-
some for persons in vital occupations to serve or remain available
for seven days or three trials. The Council's seven-day/three-trial
recommendation may derive from a concern that certain rural'
counties may not be able to support a one-day/one-trial system.
However, the Council did not articulate fully its reasons for select-
ing seven days or three trials, nor does there appear to be any em-
pirical basis for selecting these figures. By contrast, there is a sub-
stantial body of experience with the one-day/one-trial system,
including experience within Virginia, all of which suggests that the
system is appropriate for Virginia.
147
Successful implementation of a one-day/one-trial system is a
function of a jurisdiction's caseload and the size of its jury pool. In
rural areas, for example, the number of available jurors may fall
short of the need; preservation of one-day/one-trial might dictate
that jurors serve more often than urban jurors do. Or one-day/one-
trial might have to be modified to longer periods of service, e.g.,
five-days/one-trial, in certain hard-pressed jurisdictions. It is es-
gin to give less weight to the evidence presented to them and more weight to extraneous
matters, such as the personal style of the attorneys. See Canham, supra note 140, at 51;
Newsletter, supra note 140 at 2.
146. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 56; see also One-Day/One-Trial Analysis,
Center for Jury Studies Newsletter, No. 6, at 3 (Nov. 1979).
147. Jurisdictions that have tried this system have reaped a variety of benefits. For exam-
ple, in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh), one-day/one-trial brought nearly four
times as many individuals participating in jury service as before, reduced average days
served from 9 to 2, and provided fresh jurors unbiased by exposure to other cases. Newslet-
ter, supra n. 138. In Bucks County, Pennsylvania, one-day/one-trial increased substantially
the number of white collar workers serving on jury duty. Center for Jury Studies Newslet-
ter, vol. 3, No. 4, at 3 (July 1981). In the Federal District of Nevada, one-day/one-trial
improved juror utilization and improved age representation on juries. Jurors' attitudes to-
ward service also improved. Office of the Circuit Executive, Final Evaluation Report of the
One Day/One Trial Jury Project, United States District Court, District of Nevada, (1986)
(unpublished draft). And in Sonoma County, California (Santa Rosa), a one-day/one-trial
system resulted in "Peanuts" cartoonist Charles Schultz returning to his important occupa-
tion by noon of the day he was called. Center for Jury Studies Newsletter, No. 6, at 5 (Nov.
1979); see also supra note 142.
In Virginia, Henry County has successfully used a one-day/one-trial system. Similar short
term systems are used in Buckingham, Highland and Buena Vista counties where persons
are summoned per case and few people have been called to report more than once in a term.
MUNSTERMAN SURVEY, supra note 71, at 21.
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sential that each circuit have the discretion to design a workable
system adapted to its particular needs and problems, with the
guiding star being the broadest jury participation possible. The
courts must also retain the discretion to defer service for good
cause shown.
One-day/one-trial does not in itself produce any cost savings. In-
deed, as noted in the ABA Standards, the system "can increase
jury costs because of the additional number of individuals who
must be summoned. 1 48 Many court systems, however, have re-
duced overall costs by efficient management techniques. 14 9
Abolition of exemptions also raises questions not directly ad-
dressed by the one-day/one-trial system. For example, if abolition
increases the size and variety of juror pools, some may argue for a
need for broader voir dire questioning or for more peremptory
strikes, or both, to afford counsel adequate information and choice.
This argument, however, is at least unclear, if not unpersuasive.
Another issue arguably raised by the abolition of exemptions re-
lates to juror fees. Juror fees should be increased, some may argue,
if abolition of exemptions results in longer jury service. Fee in-
creases might mitigate perception of increased inconvenience. This
argument, too, is, at least at present, unpersuasive. Experience in
other jurisdictions does not support the spectre of longer or more
onerous jury service. Moreover, the magnitude of feasible fee in-
creases would likely be so disproportionate to the value of jurors'
time as to have no significant effect.
These questions and others must be answered. So important are
the policies underlying greater public participation in the jury sys-
tem that every effort must be made to abolish exemptions and
minimize the terms of service. To this end, the General Assembly
should pass legislation: (1) abolishing exemptions; (2) instructing
each circuit to adopt one-day/one-trial or an adaptation thereof fit-
ted to the needs of the circuit and aimed at minimum terms of
148. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 56.
149. The Virginia Center for Jury Studies has listed six factors which are essential to the
efficient operation of a one-day/one-trial system: (1) computerized selection of names from
source lists; (2) accurate prediction of daily juror needs; (3) telephone call-in; (4) first-class
mail summoning; (5) rapid orientation; and (6) re-use of jurors during the service day.
Newsletter, supra note 140, at 2-3; see also One Day/One Trial Analysis, Center for Jury
Studies Newsletter, No. 6 (Nov. 1979) (noting that under-use of jurors could be abated by
making use of distribution patterns of trial starts). Implementation of these factors in con-
junction with one-day/one-trial should serve to minimize costs and inconvenience while
maximizing use of jurors.
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service; and (3) retaining in the courts the discretion to excuse or
defer service.
CONCLUSION
Exemptions are anachronisms. They are no longer justified. The
community need rationale on which exemptions were originally
based no longer exists. Nor is general personal inconvenience a suf-
ficient justification for exemptions. Such inconvenience does not
outweigh the public policy importance of broad-gauged public par-
ticipation in the justice system. Virginia should seize the opportu-
nity now to eliminate exemptions and thereby make juries more
representative, more effective, and more democratic. Justice Mur-
phy, in a statement on this point forty years ago which is especially
apt today, stated that "[u]nder our Constitution, the jury is not to
be made the representative of the most intelligent, the most
wealthy or the most successful, nor of the least intelligent, the
least wealthy or the least successful. It is a democratic institution,
representative of all qualified classes of people.'
150
150. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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